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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects on media plurality of competi-
tion between a private news rm that maximizes prots and a publicly
owned news rm that maximizes social welfare. We show that when
the costs to adapt news to readerspolitical preferences are high rel-
atively to the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences, prots in
the industry are lower, but prices, media plurality, consumer surplus,
and social welfare are higher in the mixed duopoly than in the pri-
vate duopoly case. The contrary is true when the costs to adapt news
to readerspolitical preferences are low relatively to the intensity of
the readerspolitical preferences. This result is conrmed with the
introduction of advertising and ine¢ ciencies of the public rm.
Keywords: Media Plurality, Media Firms, Private Duopoly, Mixed
Duopoly.
JEL Classication: H42, L13, L82.
1 Introduction
Media plurality refers to the diversity of political opinions with a voice in
the news market. Many defend the view that media plurality increases social
welfare, since it satises readersdiverse political preferences and promotes
Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Norwegian
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democracy (see Coase, 1974; Downs, 1957; Hayek, 1945; and Mill, 1859).
However, some fear that news markets with only private actors cannot guar-
antee media plurality, since private actors mostly follow prot motives (Her-
man and Chomsky, 1998). This may be so mainly for two reasons. First,
the provision of media plurality can increase the costs of news rms due to
the extra costs of gathering information and adapting news to the readers
political preferences. Second, the provision of media plurality can imply that
news rms have to focus on non-mainstream political opinions that generate
less demand and therefore less revenue.
Some argue that governments can try to solve this market failure by the
introduction of publicly owned news rms whose objective it is to maximize
social welfare and that compete directly with private news rms that maxi-
mize prots. Markets characterized by the presence of both public rms and
private rms are usually called mixed oligopolies. The idea behind mixed
oligopolies in the news market is that by maximizing social welfare, publicly
owned news rms could balance the news market between the need to gener-
ate prots and provide media plurality. In particular, the role of the publicly
owned news rms would be to inuence the behavior of privately owned news
rms in terms of media plurality. If the presence of a public news rm pro-
motes media plurality, then, according to the literature on mixed oligopolies,
we say that the mixed oligopoly has achieved "regulation by participation"
(see Harris and Wiens, 1980; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bös, 1991; Cremer
et al., 1989; De Fraja and Delbono, 1990; Estrin and de Meza, 1995; and
Matsumura, 1998).
In fact, the literature on mixed oligopolies starts from the premise that
when private actors do not provide the market with some socially desirable
good, such as for instance media plurality, governments have two options.
The rst option is to introduce a regulatory body that regulates and controls
industry behavior in terms of providing such a good. The second option is
to introduce a publicly owned rm that produces this good and that com-
petes directly with the private rms. In the news market, the media industry
ercely opposes the rst option, since one of the founding principles of jour-
nalism is independence and freedom of the press, and an external regulator
might in some cases have to intervene directly in the editorial decisions of a
newspaper. See for instance the debate in England about the phone-hacking
scandal in the News of the World (The Economist, 2012). However, mixed
oligopolies in the news market are a very widespread phenomenon across
many countries (e.g., the BBC in England).
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In this paper, we study the proposition that markets with publicly owned
news rms can contribute to increased media plurality.1 In particular, we
analyze the e¤ects on media plurality of competition between a private news
rm that maximizes prots and a publicly owned news rm that maximizes
social welfare, when news rms can adapt news to readerspolitical prefer-
ences.
In order to do this, we use the standard modeling strategy of the media
plurality literature, the Hotelling (1929) model (see Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996;
Gabszewicz et al., 2001, 2002; and Roger 2009).2 In this sense, news rms
political orientation and readerspolitical preferences are presented on the
Hotelling (1929) line. Readers subscribe to an ideal-political ideology and
they experience disutility when consuming news, which does not conform to
their political views.
We di¤er from the standard media literature that uses the Hotelling model
in two ways. First, we introduce the possibility for news rms to adapt news
to readerspolitical preferences. Media rms can choose between a single-
ideology strategy (i.e., a point on the Hotelling line), or a multi-ideology
strategy by adapting news to readerspolitical preferences (i.e., a line seg-
ment). In order to model this, we follow the product adaptation set up for
consumer markets by Alexandrov (2008). In particular, when a news rm de-
cides to adapt its products it has to weight the costs of adaptation (i.e., the
cost related with adapting news products to readerspolitical preferences)
with the benets (i.e., extra demand).
1Publicly owned news rms can arguably also be more prone to political pressure. We
are therefore implicitly assuming that publicly owned news rms are only restricted to
maximize welfare (news rmsprots plus consumer surplus), but apart from this they
have the freedom to choose editorial political orientations. The empirical evidence shows
that there are some examples of independent publicly owned news rms, like the BBC,
but also of publicly owned news rms in countries like Russia that are controlled by the
government (see Djankov et al., 2003).
2In this way, we follow the literature on media plurality. This literature tries to dis-
entangle what can a¤ect the level of media plurality in a market. Some of the factors
that inuence media plurality are the following: the concentration of the media industry
(Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996; and George, 2007 and Roger, 2009); advertising (Gabszewicz et
al., 2001, 2002; Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Ellman and Germano, 2009; A¤eldt et
al., 2013; and Garcia Pires, 2013); the diversity of readerspolitical preferences (Garcia
Pires, 2013); market structure (Steiner, 1952; George and Waldfogel, 2003; and George
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011); subsidies (Lerocha and Wellbrock, 2011); party political com-
petition (Noam, 1987; and Schulz and Weimann, 1989); and technology (Gentzkow, 2007;
and George and Hogendorn, 2012).
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Second, we consider two di¤erent market structures: a private duopoly,
with only privately owned news rms that maximize prots; and a mixed
duopoly, with a private news rm that maximizes prots and a publicly
owned news rm that maximizes social welfare (prots of the private and
the public news rms and consumer surplus).
In this set up, we show that the di¤erence between the private duopoly
and the mixed duopoly holds for the relation between the costs to adapt
news to readerspolitical preferences and the intensity of the readerspo-
litical preferences. When the costs of adapting news to readers political
preferences are high relatively to the intensity of the readerspolitical prefer-
ences, prots in the industry are lower, but prices, media plurality, consumer
surplus, and social welfare are higher in the mixed duopoly than in the pri-
vate duopoly. The contrary is true when the costs to adapt news to readers
political preferences are low relatively to the intensity of the readerspolitical
preferences. In other words, in the news market "regulation by participation"
is not always achieved.
The reason for this is that news rms compete both on prices and media
plurality. Accordingly, if news rms were to compete only on prices "regula-
tion by participation" would more easily be achieved (see Harris and Wiens,
1980; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bös, 1991; Cremer et al., 1989; De Fraja and
Delbono, 1990; Estrin and de Meza, 1995; and Matsumura, 1998). When the
public rm increases media plurality (increasing consumer surplus) it also
increases price competition between rms (reducing consumer surplus and
prots). As a result, the capacity of a public rm to attain "regulation by
participation" depends on the relation between the costs of providing media
plurality and the intensity of readerspolitical preferences.
In fact, when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences
are high relatively to the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences, news
rms in the private duopoly reduce media plurality (reducing consumer sur-
plus) in order to restrain price competition (increasing prots). In the mixed
duopoly, the public news rm increases media plurality (to increase consumer
surplus) even at the costs of erce price competition (that decreases prots),
given that the objective of the public news rm is to maximize social welfare,
and not only prots. However, the positive e¤ects of media plurality on con-
sumer surplus can dominate the negative e¤ects of higher prices on prots
when the costs of providing media plurality are high. In this way, only when
the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences are high relatively
to the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences, can a publicly owned
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news rm achieve "regulation by participation."
We make two robustness tests of the results in the benchmark case in our
model: ine¢ ciencies in the provision of media plurality by the public rm
and the presence of an advertising market. We nd that when the public
rm is not as e¢ cient as the private rm in providing media plurality, the
mixed duopoly is more favorable than the private duopoly if the public rm
disadvantage is not too large.
In turn, when news rms derive revenues from advertising as well (and
not only from selling news), the equilibrium of the model depends on the size
of the advertising market. This is due to the two-sided nature of the news
market. In a two-sided news market, advertisers prefer to buy ad space in
the news rm with the larger audience. Therefore, news rms have incen-
tives to adapt news to readerspolitical preferences, since this can increase
audiences, and thereby increase advertising revenues. However, this comes at
a cost, given that rms have to incur higher costs to adapt news to readers
preferences.
Besides, when the advertising market is small, the revenues from selling
news are more important than the revenues from selling ads. The opposite
is the case when the size of the advertising market is large. As a result,
when the advertisement market is small, we obtain the same results from the
benchmark case. When the advertising market is large, in turn, media plu-
rality and consumer surplus are always lower, but prots are always higher
under the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly. Social welfare, how-
ever, is similar to the benchmark case. The di¤erences between the large and
the small advertising market arise because with a large advertising market,
news rms can support erce price competition with the revenues from ad-
vertising. Therefore, in the private duopoly when the advertising market is
large, news rms over-invest in media plurality. In the mixed duopoly, the
public news rm considers these e¤ects and restricts the investment in media
plurality in order to reduce price competition and thereby increase prots of
all the news rms.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In the next section, we
present the base model of media plurality. In section three, we analyze the
benchmark case for the private and the mixed duopoly case. In section four,
we study the case where the public rm is ine¢ cient relatively to the private
rm in providing media plurality. In section ve, we introduce advertising.
In section six, we discuss our main results.
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2 The Model
In this paper, we study the e¤ects on media plurality of the participation of
publicly owned news rms in media markets with private actors. In order to
do this, we adopt the standard model in the media plurality literature, the
Hotelling (1929) duopoly model (see for instance Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996,
Gabszewicz et al., 2001, 2002, and Roger, 2009).3 The political preferences
of readers are distributed on the Hotelling line as shown in gure 1. To
the Hotelling model, we add the standard assumption of the mixed duopoly
literature. In particular, we assume that while private news rms maximize
prots, publicly owned news rms maximize social welfare, measured as the
sum of consumer surplus and the prots of the news rms in the media market
(private plus public). See Harris and Wiens (1980), Vickers and Yarrow
(1988), Bös (1991), Cremer et al. (1989), De Fraja and Delbono (1990),
Estrin and de Meza (1995), and Matsumura (1998). We then consider two
cases: (1) a private duopoly where both news rms are privately owned and
maximize prots; and (2) a mixed duopoly with a privately owned news rm
that maximizes prots and a publicly owned news rm that maximizes social
welfare.
We di¤er from the standard media plurality approach of Gabszewicz et
al. (2001) in one important way. With the aim of studying the e¤ects
on media plurality of mixed duopolies (i.e., markets with both private and
public news rms), we depart from the framework with single-ideology media
rms by considering multi-ideology media rms. In other words, media rms
can choose between a single-ideology and a multi-ideology strategy. Single-
ideology news rms only cover a point on the line, while multi-ideology news
rms cover a line segment (see gure 1).
To model multi-ideology media rms (i.e., adaptation of news to readers
political preferences), we follow the approach by Alexandrov (2008) to fat
3The media plurality literature is related to the literature on media bias. Media bias
refers to the bias of the press in the selection of which events are reported and how they
are covered (see Groseclose and Milyo, 2005; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Baron,
2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan,
2007; Ellman and Germano, 2009; Stone, 2011; Durante and Knight, 2012; and Germano
and Meier, 2013). Higher media plurality can conduce to lower media bias, since the
news market covers more political opinions. However, higher media plurality does not
necessarily always lead to lower media bias since even when many opinions are covered in
the media market, the truth might still not emerge (see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008; and
Gentzkow et al., 2012).
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Figure 1: Media plurality: L located at 0 and R at 1
products. Fat products can be dened as products that contain a set of
characteristics amongst which consumers can choose without being charged
extra for this. In the context of the news market, we talk about fat news
when the same media outlet caters to di¤erent political opinions, and each
reader can pick what they prefer more4.
ReadersPreferences. As in Hotelling (1929), readers are uniformly dis-
tributed on a line of length one: [0; 1]. The line represents political orienta-
tion (see gure 1). The di¤erent political orientations are ordered from left
to right: 0 represents far left and 1 represents far right. We dene t as the in-
tensity of the readerspolitical preferences (i.e., transport costs in Hotelling).
Readers patronize only one media outlet (i.e., readers have unit demands).
In this way, readers have an ideal-political opinion and they incur a disutility
cost from buying a newspaper with a di¤erent political orientation from their
ideal one.
The location of a media rm on the line represents the political orienta-
tion(s) covered by the news rm. The two news rms are labeled i = L;R.
We assume that newspaper L is left-oriented and newspaper R is right-
oriented and that the two media rms are located at the opposite extremes
of the line: news rm L is located at point xL = 0 and news rm R is located
4A related, but not identical, concept to fat products is customized products (see
Dewan et al., 2003). Customized products are products that consist of a standard product
that can be transformed into di¤erent customized products, which consumers can acquire
at an additional price. Then, under customization, and contrary to fat products, price
discrimination is central. In the case of media markets, it seems more adequate to think
in terms of fat products than customization, since price discrimination, in spite of some
attempts, is not the standard business practice in the industry. For this reason, price
discrimination is not present in our formalization.
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at point 1  xR = 1 (see gure 1)5.
To our knowledge, with the exception of Garcia Pires (2013), the models
that use the Hotelling framework to study media plurality assume that media
rms can only supply the media market with one political opinion, xi, with
i = L;R (i.e., single-ideology media rms). In this sense, media rms sell
the same political view to di¤erent readers. We di¤er from this approach by
opening up for media rms to adapt news to readerspolitical preferences.
In particular, in our set up news rms can become multi-ideology news rms
by covering di¤erent political locations.
To model multi-ideology media rms, we adapt the approach by Alexan-
drov (2008) for fat products for media markets. In particular, we denote by
ki the media plurality scope of news rm i, which equals the length of the
Hotelling line covered, 0  ki  1, with i = L;R. Media rms can then de-
cide to adopt a single-ideology strategy or a multi-ideology strategy. A single-
ideology strategy corresponds to a single point on the line (xL = xR = 0),
while a multi-ideology orientation corresponds to a line segment ([0; kL] and
[1  kR; 1])6. This is depicted in gure 1, where newspapers L and R are lo-
cated at points 0 and 1, respectively. Reader x is indi¤erent between buying
from L or R. Point kL is the end point of the set of political opinions o¤ered
by L. If kL = 0, L only o¤ers political opinion 0 and all readers between
[0; x] consume 0. If kL > 0, L o¤ers the set of political opinions [0; kL]. In
this case, readers located on [0; kL] consume the political opinion that they
prefer, while readers on [kL; x] consume kL. Similar interpretation holds for
5In this way, we follow the literature in media economics in that media outlets only
give voice to one political area, i.e.: a media outlet does not provide two opposite political
ideas. This can be so for at least three reasons. First, newspaper owners might prefer
a given political ideology. For instance, all newspapers and TV channels belonging to
Rupert Murdoch (the News Inc. group) move in the conservative area. Second, it can be
very costly for a newspaper to report in opposite political areas, given that investigative
journalism is expensive. The idea is that for a newspaper to report in two di¤erent
political areas has very little economies of scope. Third, a newspaper that reports in
opposite political ideologies can lose credibility amongst readers. In fact, readers seem to
be very sensitive about news biased to the opposite of the political area that they support.
6We therefore assume that a newspaper does not adapt news away from where they
are politically located. The reasons for this to be the case can be the same as the ones
mentioned in the previous footnote in relation to a newspaper supporting more than one
political ideology. In addition, note that in the context of the Hotelling model, when rms
move in the direction of the line, they increase price competition. Consequently, for a news
outlet it is always preferable to adapt news starting from their political location rather
than away from it, because the e¤ects on price competition are smaller.
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new rm R.
With a single-ideology strategy, a media rm only reports one political
orientation and therefore o¤ers standard news to readers with di¤erent po-
litical orientations. In turn, with a multi-ideology strategy, a media rm
covers di¤erent political ideologies and, as such, it o¤ers adapted news to
readers located inside its media plurality segment, and standard news to
readers outside its media plurality segment (see gure 1). In other words,
readers located inside the media plurality segment of a news rm consume
the news reecting exactly the political orientation that they subscribe to,
while readers located outside the media plurality segment consume the news
that is closest to their ideal-opinion. Below we present the specic technology
available to media rms to adapt news to readerspolitical preferences.
The utility of a reader x located in the left hand side segment of the line
outside the media plurality segment of news rm L is:
U = v   pL   t (x  kL) , (1)
where kL is the end point of the media plurality segment of news rm
L, v is a positive constant that captures readersreservation price, t is the
intensity of the readerspolitical preferences and pL is the price charged by
news rm L. A similar expression applies for a reader x0 located in the
right hand side segment of the line outside the media plurality segment of
news rm R. In this sense, a higher t represents the fact that readers have
higher disutility from consuming news that does not conform to their political
preferences. Note also that if reader x is located inside the multi-ideology
segment of news rm L, the readers utility is: U = v   pL, since t = 0 (i.e.,
the readers ideal opinion is o¤ered).
Like in Dewan (2003), we assume that in order to provide media plurality,
news rms have to incur an adaptation cost (C) that equals:
Ci =
k2i
2
, i = L;R, (2)
where  represents the informational and exibility costs to adapt news to
the readerspolitical preferences. In this way, the adaptation costs increase
with the level of media plurality o¤ered. Also the higher the informational
and exibility costs to adapt news to the readerspolitical preferences (), the
more costly it becomes for news rms to provide di¤erent political opinions
in the news market.
Prots for news rm i are then:
9
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i = piDi   Ci, i = L;R, (3)
where Di is the demand for newspaper i. Accordingly, DL = x and
DR = 1   x, where x is the reader indi¤erent between buying from news
rm L or from news rm R.
We dene consumer surplus (CS) as:
CS = (v   pL)x t
Z x
kL
(x  kL) dx+(v   pR) (1  x) t
Z 1 kR
x
((1  x)  kR) dx.
(4)
In turn, we measure social welfare (W ) as the sum of the two news rms
prots (L + R) and consumer surplus (CS):
W = L + R + CS. (5)
The reader who is indi¤erent between buying from news rm L or from
news rm R, x, is the one that makes:
v   pL   t (x   kL) = v   pR   t (1  kR   x) . (6)
Solving for x, and noting that DL = x and DR = 1   x, we nd that
Di equals:
Di =
pj pi+t(1 kj+ki)
2t
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (7)
Consumer surplus then simplies to:
CS =
(pR pL)2 t(t(kL+kR 1)2+2(pL 2v+pR+(pR pL)(kR kL)))
4t
. (8)
The timing of the game is the following. In the rst stage, editors select
ki. In the second stage, news rms choose pi.
The model above represents the benchmark case in this paper. In subse-
quent sections, we will check the robustness of the results in the benchmark
case to the introduction of ine¢ ciencies by the public rm and a two-sided
market with advertising. Next, we present the main changes in the bench-
mark case with these two cases.
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Ine¢ ciencies of the Public Firm. We assume that the private rm is
more e¢ cient than the public rm in providing media plurality. This can be
due for example to the public rm having a non-professional management, or
other type of political constraints, such government control. We then have
that L > R, i.e., the costs of adapting news are rm-specic:
Ci =
ik
2
i
2
, i = L;R, (9)
where i are now the informational and exibility costs to adapt news to
the readerspolitical preferences by the media rm i = L;R.
Advertising. In the advertising case, news rms derive revenues from sell-
ing news and from selling advertising space. In other words, the news market
has a two-sided nature. Like in Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and
Valletti (2008), we assume that the demand for ads for the news rm i is:
ri =   ai, i = L;R, (10)
where ri is the price of advertising per reader and ai is advertising volume.
In turn,  and  are parameters related with the size of the advertising
market.
Gross advertising income is then:
Ai = (  ai) aiDi, i = L;R, (11)
where Di is the demand for the news rm i. Accordingly, DL = x and
DR = 1   x (remember that x is the reader who is indi¤erent between
buying news from L or from R).
As will be seen more clearly below, in this set up ad demand depends on
the size of the news rms audience. More precisely, ad demand is positively
correlated with the size of the news rms audience. This feature gives our
model a two-sided market framework since there are positive externalities
between the consumer and the advertising markets.
Prots for news rm i are now:
i = piDi   Ci + Ai, i = L;R. (12)
The timing of the advertising game is the following. In the rst stage,
editors select ki; in the second stage, news rms decide ai; in the third stage,
editors choose pi.
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3 Benchmark Case
In this section, we analyze the benchmark case for the private and mixed
duopoly case.
3.1 Benchmark: Private Duopoly
In this subsection, we analyze the benchmark case with two private editorial
outlets, i = L;R, which are located at point 0 and point 1, respectively. The
two rms have as their only objective to maximize prots. As usual, we solve
the model by backward induction.
Stage 2: Prices. In the second stage, news rms choose prices pi, with
i = L;R. Prices are found by maximizing the prot expression (equation 3)
with respect to pi. The rst order condition (FOC) for prices equals7:
@i
@pi
=
(t(ki kj+1)+(pj 2pi))
2t
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (13)
Solving di
dpi
and dj
dpj
simultaneously for pi and pj, we obtain:
pi =
t(ki kj+3)
3
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (14)
Stage 1: Media Plurality. In the rst stage, news rms choose media
plurality levels ki, with i = L;R. The FOC for media plurality equals:
di
dki
= @i
@ki
+ @i
@pj
dpj
dki
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (15)
The choice of the media plurality levels has two e¤ects. The rst is the
direct e¤ect of media plurality ki on prots i. The second is the indirect
e¤ect of media plurality ki on prots i, via the e¤ects on the rivals prices
pj. It can be shown that:
@i
@ki
=
 
pi
2
  ki

+
 
pi
2t
    t
3

, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (16)
We can see that the indirect e¤ect is negative. This is so because an
increase in media plurality by rm i leads to erce price competition with
the rival j (i.e.: lower pj), which in turn reduces the prots of rm i (i.e.:
7The second order conditions (SOCs) are in the Appendix A.
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lower i). In turn, the direct e¤ect will depend on the relation between prices
(pi) and the costs of media plurality (ki).
We can further simplify the FOC for media plurality (equation 16) by
substituting for pi from equation 14:
di
dki
=
t(3 kj+ki)
9
  ki, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (17)
Solving di
dki
and dj
dkj
simultaneously for ki and kj (with i; j = L;R and
i 6= j), we obtain the equilibrium media plurality levels:
ki =
t
3
> 0, i = L;R. (18)
We can then note that in the benchmark private duopoly case, the posi-
tive e¤ects of media plurality (higher demand) dominate the negative e¤ects
(erce price competition and higher costs). As a result, media rms adapt
news to readerspolitical preferences and media plurality is increased rela-
tively to the standard case in the literature where news rms are restricted
to a single-ideology strategy.
To derive equilibrium prices substitute for ki (i = L;R) from equation 18
in equation 14:
pi = t, i = L;R. (19)
The price of the standard product (pi) in a private duopoly with ex-
ogenous choice of location then equals the level of intensity of the readers
political preferences (t). More interesting, as we have seen, the duopolists
always choose positive levels of media plurality (see equation 18). Further-
more, media plurality increases with the intensity of the readerspolitical
preferences (t), but decreases with the informational and exibility costs of
adapting news to the readerspolitical preferences (). We also note that,
given the prices in equation 19 and media plurality levels in equation 18, the
demand levels Di are always positive, since Di = 12 , with i = L;R (i.e., the
news rms divide the news market in half).
We have also to ensure that the media plurality segments of the two news
rms do not overlap. It can be shown that ki  Di = 12 (i = L;R) for
  2t
3
. In this respect, for  = 2t
3
all possible political opinions on the line
are covered, since ki = 12 (i = L;R). This is the case when the costs of media
13
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plurality are not too large relatively to the intensity of the readerspolitical
preferences.
3.2 Benchmark: Mixed Duopoly
In this subsection, we assume that news rm L is a publicly owned news rm
that maximizes social welfare, while news rm R is a private news rm that
maximizes prots. We continue to assume that the two editorial outlets, L
and R are located at point 0 and point 1, respectively. Given the symmetry
of the model, the results are the same if the publicly owned news rm is
located at point 1, and the private news rm is located at point 0 on the
line.
Stage 2: Prices. In the second stage, news rms choose prices pi, with
i = L;R. For news rm R, the privately owned news rm, prices are obtained
by maximizing the prot expression (equation 3) with respect to pi. It is
straightforward to check that the FOC for prices for news rm R is the same
as in the private duopoly case (equation 13).
For news rm L, the publicly owned news rm, the FOC is found by
substituting DL from equation 7 in the social welfare function (equation 5).
It results:
@WL
@pL
= (pR pL)
2t
. (20)
Solving @WL
@pL
and dR
dpR
simultaneously for pL and pR, we obtain:
pL = pR = t (kR   kL + 1) . (21)
Stage 1: Media Plurality. In the rst stage, news rms choose media
plurality levels ki, with i = L;R. The FOC for media plurality for the private
news rm is the same as in the private duopoly case (equation 16). We can
then simplify the FOC for media plurality for the privately owned news rm
(equation 16) by substituting for pR from equation 21:
dR
dkR
= 1
3
(t (kR   kL + 1))  kR. (22)
In turn, for the publicly owned news rm, after substituting for pL and
pR from equation 21, we have that the FOC for media plurality equals:
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dWL
dkL
= 1
2
(t (1  (kL + kR))  2kL) . (23)
Solving dL
dkL
and dR
dkR
simultaneously for kL and kR, we obtain the equilib-
rium levels of media plurality:
kL =
(3 2t)t
(2t+3)(2 t)
kR =
2t
(2t+3)(2 t) . (24)
We can derive equilibrium prices by substituting for ki (i = L;R) from
equation 24 in equation 21:
pL = pR =
62t
(2t+3)(2 t) . (25)
From equations 24 and 25, we obtain the demand levels for news rm L
and news rm R:
DL =
(t+)(3 2t)
(2t+3)(2 t)
DR = 1  (t+)(3 2t)(2t+3)(2 t) . (26)
We need to restrict demand levels to being positive, otherwise, there is
no demand for news. We can see that DL and DR are positive for:
  2t
3
. (27)
We assume that this condition holds in the rest of this section.
Next, we would also like to know the relation between kL and kR:
kL   kR = ( 2t)t(2t+3)(2 t) . (28)
It can be shown that kL < kR for 2t3 <  < 2t, and kL > kR for  > 2t.
Then the publicly owned news rm only provides more media plurality than
the privately owned news rm when the costs of adapting news are high in
relation to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences. The contrary occurs
when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences are low in
relation to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences.
The reason for this is the following. When  is low in relation to t, the
private news rm has no di¢ culties in providing media plurality without
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reducing prots signicantly, since the costs of adapting news are relatively
low. Therefore, the publicly owned news rm can reduce price competition
by reducing the level of media plurality it provides. In fact, as we have seen
in equation 16, when the news rms approach the center of the line due to an
increase in media plurality, price competition becomes ercer. In turn, when
 is high in relation to t, the privately owned news rm reduces the level of
media plurality, since adaptation of news is now relatively more costly. Due
to this, the publicly owned news rm increases the level of media plurality
in order to increase consumer surplus. In other words, the publicly owned
news rms only "intervenes" in media plurality when the private news rm
reduces the level of media plurality it provides. This is the case when the
costs to adapt news are higher relatively to the readersintensity of political
preferences.
As in the private duopoly case, we also have to guarantee that the media
plurality segments of L and R do not overlap. Since the publicly owned news
rm and the privately owned news rm provide di¤erent levels of media
plurality (see equation 24), we now need two conditions for the two media
plurality segments of the news rms to not overlap: kL  DL and 1  kR 
DL. We can show that these two conditions are satised if   2t3 . This is
the same needed for demand levels to be positive, which we assume is always
satised. The two media plurality segments will then never overlap in the
mixed duopoly case.
3.3 Benchmark: Private Duopoly versusMixed Duopoly
In this subsection, we compare the equilibrium of the private duopoly and the
mixed duopoly cases in terms of prices, media plurality, consumer surplus,
and social welfare.
We can start by showing that the di¤erence between prices in the private
duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case is:
P = pMD   pPD =   ( 2t)t2(2t+3)(2 t) , (29)
where the subscripts PD andMD stand for the private duopoly case and
the mixed duopoly case, respectively. Given that we assume that   2t
3
, it
results that pMD < pPD for 2t3 <  < 2t, and pMD > pPD for  > 2t (see
gure 2). We then have that only when the costs of adapting news to readers
political preferences () are low in relation to the intensity of readerspolitical
16
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preferences (t), prices are lower in the mixed duopoly case than in the private
duopoly case. The contrary is true for high  in relation to t, where prices are
higher in the mixed duopoly case. In order to understand this outcome, we
need to proceed to compare media plurality in the private and in the mixed
duopoly cases.
We have that the di¤erence between media plurality in the private duopoly
case and the mixed duopoly case equals:
K = KMD  KPD = (3 2t)( 2t)t3(2t+3)(2 t) , (30)
where KMD = kMD;L + kMD;R and KPD = kPD;L + kPD;R. As shown in
gure 2, we have that KMD < KPD for 2t3 <  < 2t, and KMD > KPD for
 > 2t (see Appendix B for proof). As such, when the costs of adapting
news to readerspolitical preferences () are high relatively to the intensity
of readerspolitical preferences (t), media plurality is higher in the mixed
duopoly case than in the private duopoly case. The contrary is true for low 
in relation to t. Therefore, only for high  in relation to t, can participation
in the news market of a publicly owned news rm that maximizes social
welfare achieve "regulation by participation" in terms of media plurality. In
other words, for high  in relation to t, the public news rm can inuence the
behavior of the private news rm and conduce to higher media plurality than
when only privately owned news rms are active in the news market. When
this is so, there is no need for the government to intervene in the industry
through a regulator that controls the level of media plurality in the industry.
We can now also understand the behavior of prices in the private and
in the mixed duopoly cases. For 2t
3
<  < 2t, prices are higher and media
plurality is lower under the mixed duopoly than under the private duopoly
case. The contrary is true for  > 2t, where prices are lower and media
plurality is higher under the mixed duopoly than under the private duopoly
case. This occurs because when media plurality is higher, price competition
is erce since news rms move in the direction of the center of the line. In
other words, news rms have to compete more aggressively on prices for
readers since their political o¤ers are less di¤erentiated.
From the above, when comparing the mixed and the private duopoly
cases, we have two combinations of prices and media plurality. First, higher
prices and lower media plurality under the mixed duopoly than under the
private duopoly case for 2t
3
<  < 2t. Second, lower prices and higher media
plurality under the mixed duopoly than under the private duopoly case for
17
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Figure 2: Prices and Media Plurality: Mixed versus Private Duopoly
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 > 2t.
Lower prices and higher media plurality increase consumer surplus, while
the opposite is true for higher prices and lower media plurality. However,
lower prices can either increase or decrease prots, given that while it reduces
revenues per newspaper sold, it also increases demand. In addition, lower
media plurality can either increase or decrease prots, since on the one hand
it reduce costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences but on the
other hand it can reduce demand. The opposite e¤ects on prots arise for
higher prices and higher media plurality.
Looking at prots under the two regimes, we have:
 = MD   PD = ((2t(19t+12) 153
2) 4t3)( 2t)t2
18(2t+3)2(2 t)2 , (31)
where MD = MD;L+MD;R and PD = PD;L+PD;R. It can be shown
that MD > PD for  < 2t, and MD < PD for  > 2t (see Appendix B).
We then have that prots under the mixed duopoly case are higher than
prots under the private duopoly case when the costs of adapting news to
readerspolitical preferences () are low relatively to the intensity of readers
political preferences (t). This coincides with higher prices and lower media
plurality under the mixed duopoly case. Furthermore, this indicates that
the lower costs associated with lower levels of media plurality dominate the
lower revenues from lower prices, and that the lower demand that results
from lower levels of media plurality dominates the higher demand due to
lower prices. The opposite arises for high  relatively to t, where prots and
prices are lower but media plurality is higher under the mixed duopoly case.
This means that the extra demand due to higher levels of media plurality and
higher demand due to lower prices dominate the extra costs and the erce
price competition associated with higher levels of media plurality.
In terms of consumer surplus, we have that the di¤erence between con-
sumer surplus under the private duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case
is:
CS = CSMD   CSPD = (4t
3(7 2t)+92((36 11t) 6t2))( 2t)t2
36(2t+3)2(2 t)22 . (32)
It can be shown that CSMD < CSPD for  < 2t, and CSMD > CSPD
for  > 2t (see Appendix B). We then have that consumer surplus under the
mixed duopoly case is higher than the consumer surplus under the private
19
SNF Working Paper No 11/14
Figure 3: Consumer Surplus, Prots and Social Welfare: Mixed versus Pri-
vate Duopoly
duopoly case when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences
() are high relatively to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences (t).
This coincides with lower prices and higher media plurality under the mixed
duopoly case. The opposite occurs for high  relatively to t, where consumer
surplus and media plurality are lower and prices are higher under the mixed
duopoly case.
In turn, in terms of social welfare (consumer surplus plus news rms
prots), we have that the di¤erence between social welfare under the private
duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case is:
W = WMD  WPD = ( 2t)
2(4t3+(182 t(8t+15)))t2
36(2t+3)2(2 t)22 . (33)
It can be shown that WMD  WPD can only be negative for 23t <  <
(5+
p
89)t
12
(see Appendix B). In gure 3, we summarize the results in terms of
prots, consumer surplus and social welfare.
We can now conclude that social welfare is higher under the private
duopoly case when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical prefer-
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ences are low relatively to the readersintensity of political preferences (i.e.,
low  in relation to t). In turn, social welfare is higher under the mixed
duopoly case when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical prefer-
ences are high relatively to the readersintensity of political preferences (i.e.,
high  in relation to t). This occurs because, as we have seen above, when
 is low relatively to t, private rms can protably provide media plurality.
As a result, when  is low relatively to t, a private duopoly provides more
media plurality than a mixed duopoly, which is reected in lower prots in
the former relatively to the latter market structure. Accordingly, when  is
low relatively to t, in the mixed duopoly the public rm reduces the level of
media plurality in order to increase the prots of the media rms. However,
the increase in prots does not compensate for the reduction in consumer
surplus.
In this sense, it only seems worthwhile for the government to participate
in the news market via a publicly owned news rm, when the costs of adapt-
ing news to readerspolitical preferences are high relatively to the readers
intensity of political preferences. Accordingly, when  is low relatively to t,
private news rms provide su¢ cient levels of media plurality. In this way,
"regulation by participation" in terms of media plurality is not always guar-
anteed in the news markets. This might seem like a surprising result, since
the publicly owned news rm maximizes social welfare. The reason for this
is that in contrast to the mixed duopoly literature where rms compete usu-
ally only on prices, here rms compete on both prices and media plurality.
Furthermore, since more media plurality means erce price competition, the
public rm has to balance this trade-o¤. In addition, this trade-o¤ only
justies the presence of a public rm when the private rms abstain from
providing due to higher costs of media plurality relatively to readers political
preferences.
4 Ine¢ ciencies of the Public Firm
In the benchmark case, the public rm has no ine¢ ciencies. As we have
seen, in spite of this, the model generates an area where the private duopoly
provides higher social welfare than the mixed duopoly. In other words, even
when the public rm is as e¢ cient as the private rm, it is not guaranteed
that the presence of a public rm will bring higher social welfare than in a
private duopoly.
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We can ask what happens if the public rm has a higher cost of providing
media plurality (higher ) than the private rm. We might think that this
can be the case because either the public news rm is subject to political
pressure or because it has a non-professional management appointed by the
government (i.e.: either a bureaucrat or a politician). When such scenario
emerges, the public rm will nd it more costly to provide media plurality
than the private rm. As a result of this reasoning, we assume that L > R.
Note rst that the equilibrium of the private duopoly case is not changed,
since we continue to have L = R. We therefore only need to investigate
the mixed duopoly case.
4.1 Ine¢ ciencies: Mixed Duopoly
Stage 2: Prices. In the second stage, news rms choose prices pi, with
i = L;R. For news rm R, the privately owned news rm, prices are obtained
by maximizing the prot expression (equation 3) with respect to pi. It is
straightforward to check that the FOC for prices for news rm R is the same
as in the private duopoly case, see equation 13 (noting that now  = R).
For news rm L, the publicly owned news rm, the FOC is found by
substituting DL from equation 7 in the social welfare function (equation 5).
It can be seen that it is obtained the same FOC as in the benchmark case,
equation 20. As a result, the price expressions, pL and pR, are also the same
as in the benchmark case (equation 21).
Stage 1: Media Plurality. In the rst stage, news rms choose media
plurality levels ki, with i = L;R. The FOC for media plurality for the private
news rm is the same as in the private duopoly case (equation 16). We can
then simplify the FOC for media plurality for the privately owned news rm
(equation 16) by substituting for pR from equation 21:
dR
dkR
= 1
3
(t (kR   kL + 1))  RkR. (34)
In turn, for the publicly owned news rm, after substituting for pL and
pR from equation 21, we have that the FOC for media plurality equals:
dWL
dkL
= 1
2
(t (1  (kL + kR))  2kLL) . (35)
Solving dL
dkL
and dR
dkR
simultaneously for kL and kR, we obtain the equilib-
rium levels of media plurality:
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kL =
(3R 2t)t
(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t))
kR =
2tL
(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t)) . (36)
We can derive equilibrium prices by substituting for ki (i = L;R) from
equation 36 in equation 21:
pL = pR =
6LRt
(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t)) . (37)
From equations 36 and 37, we obtain the demand levels for news rm L
and news rm R:
DL =
(3R 2t)(t+L)
(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t))
DR = 1  (3R 2t)(t+L)(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t)) . (38)
We need to restrict the demand levels to being positive, otherwise, there
is no demand for news. We can see that DL and DR are positive if:
R  2t3 . (39)
We assume that this condition holds in the rest of this section.
Next, we would also like to know the relation between kL and kR:
kL   kR = (3R 2L 2t)t(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t)) . (40)
It can be shown that kL < kR, if 2t3 < R <
2
3
(t+ L), and kL > kR, if
R >
2
3
(t+ L) (see Appendix B). Then the publicly owned news rm only
provides more media plurality than the privately owned news rm when the
cost advantage of the private rm is not too large.
We need again to guarantee that the media plurality segments of L and
R do not overlap. We can show that this is the case if R  2t3 . This is the
same condition needed to guarantee that demand levels are positive, which
we assume is always satised. Then the two media plurality segments never
overlap in the mixed duopoly case.
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4.2 Ine¢ ciencies: Private Duopoly versus Mixed Duopoly
We now compare the equilibriums of the private duopoly and the mixed
duopoly cases, in terms of prices, media plurality, consumer surplus, and
social welfare.
We can start by showing that the di¤erence between prices in the private
duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case is (note that in the private duopoly
case L = R):
P = pMD   pPD =   (3R 2L 2t)t
2
(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t)) . (41)
It can be shown that pMD > pPD for 2t3 < R <
2
3
(t+ L), and pMD <
pPD for R >
2
3
(t+ L) (see Appendix B). In other words, the mixed duopoly
can only generate lower prices than the private duopoly, when the public rm
does not di¤er very much from the private rm in terms of the e¢ ciency in
providing media plurality (see also gure 2).
We have that the di¤erence between media plurality in the private duopoly
and the mixed duopoly equals:
K = KMD  KPD = (3R 2L 2t)(3R 2t)t3(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t))R . (42)
We have that KMD < KPD for 2t3 < R <
2
3
(t+ L), and KMD > KPD
for R >
2
3
(t+ L). In other words, the mixed duopoly can only generate
more media plurality than the private duopoly, when the public rm does not
di¤er very much from the private rm in terms of the e¢ ciency in providing
media plurality. In this sense, when the public rm has some ine¢ ciencies,
the di¤erence between the private and the mixed duopoly in terms of prices
and media plurality is similar to the benchmark case (see also gure 2).
Looking at prots under the two regimes, we have:
 = MD   PD =
(2t(t 9R)(3R 2t)2+L(16t3+8t2L+3R(204tR 40tL+84LR 84t2 1352R)))t2
18(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t))2R
. (43)
We can show that MD > PD for su¢ ciently low levels of R, and the
reverse MD < PD for su¢ ciently high levels of R (see Appendix B). In
other words, the mixed duopoly case can only generate more prots than the
private duopoly case, when there is not a great di¤erence between the private
and the public rm in terms of the e¢ ciency in providing media plurality.
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In terms of consumer surplus, we have that the di¤erence between con-
sumer surplus under the private duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case
is:
CS = CSMD   CSPD =
(t(3R 2t)(4t2+3R(15R 4t))+L(3243R 2t(1172R 4t(9R t))))(3R 2L 2t)t2
36(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t))22R
. (44)
We can demonstrate that CSMD > CSPD for su¢ ciently high levels of
R, and the reverse, CSMD < CSPD, for su¢ ciently low levels of R (see
Appendix B). In other words, the mixed duopoly case can only generate
more consumer surplus than the private duopoly case, when there is not
a great di¤erence between the private and the public rm in terms of the
e¢ ciency in providing media plurality.
In turn, in terms of social welfare (consumer surplus plus news rms
prots), we have that the di¤erence between social welfare under the private
duopoly and the mixed duopoly is:
W = WMD  WPD =
t(4t2 8tR+92R)(3R 2t)2 42L(363R 4t3 57t2R+32t2R)+2L(3R 2t)(273R 8t3 48t2R+40t2R)
36(2L(3R t)+t(3R 2t))22Rt 2
.
(45)
It can be shown that WMD < WPD for lower values of R, and WMD >
WPD for higher values of R (see Appendix B). In other words, the mixed
duopoly case can only generate more social welfare than the private duopoly
case, when there is not a great di¤erence between the private and the public
rm in terms of the e¢ ciency in providing media plurality. In the case where
the public rm has some ine¢ ciencies, then, the behavior in terms of prots,
consumer surplus and social welfare is similar to the one under the benchmark
case (see gure 3).
5 Advertising
So far, we have abstracted from a central characteristic of media markets: ad-
vertising. However, as is well known, advertising is a very important source
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of revenues in media markets. Since news rms derive revenues from sell-
ing news and advertising, the media market can be considered a two-sided
market. In this section, we look at the consequences of advertising in our
model.
5.1 Advertising: Private Duopoly
In this subsection, we analyze the private duopoly case with advertising.
Stage 3: Prices. In the second stage, news rms choose prices pi, with
i = L;R. Prices are found by maximizing the prot expression (equation
12) with respect to pi. It can be checked that the FOC for prices in the
advertising model is the same as in the benchmark case. Therefore equations
13 and 14 continue to apply.
Stage 2: Advertising. In the second stage, the news rms choose adver-
tising levels ai, with i = L;R. The FOC for ai is:
di
dai
=
(pj pi+t+tki tkj)( 2ai)
2t
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (46)
Substituting for pi and pj from equation 14, we can simplify didai to:
di
dai
=
(3 kj+ki)( 2ai)
6
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (47)
Solving di
dai
and dj
daj
simultaneously for ai and aj (with i; j = L;R and
i 6= j), we obtain:
ai =

2
, i = L;R. (48)
Gross advertising income (Ai) can be found by substituting for ai from
equation 48 in equation 11:
Ai =
2
4
Di, i = L;R. (49)
Advertising income, then, increases with the demand for news (Di). This
shows the two-sided nature of the news market in the advertising model,
since there are positive externalities between the market for news and the
market for advertising. In other words, news rms with higher sales are more
attractive for advertisers. As such, news rms have incentives to increase the
demand for news in order to augment the demand for ads.
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Stage 1: Media Plurality. In the rst stage, news rms choose media
plurality levels ki, with i = L;R. The FOC for media plurality equals:
di
dki
= @i
@ki
+ @i
@pj
dpj
dki
+ @Ai
@ki
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (50)
The only di¤erence to the benchmark case is the term @Ai
@ki
, the e¤ect of
media plurality on advertising. Solving the FOC, we obtain:
@i
@ki
= 1
3
pi   ki + 28 ; i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (51)
The important thing to note relatively to the benchmark case is that
media plurality has a positive e¤ect on advertising, since @Ai
@ki
= 
2
8
> 0. This
is because when a rm provides media plurality, readership increases, which
attract advertisers.
We can simplify the FOC for media plurality (equation 51) by substituting
for pi from equation 14:
di
dki
=
t(3 kj+ki)
9
+ 
2
8
  ki, i; j = L;R and i 6= j. (52)
Solving di
dki
and dj
dkj
simultaneously for ki and kj (with i; j = L;R and
i 6= j), we obtain the equilibrium media plurality levels:
ki =
(8t+32)
24
> 0, i = L;R. (53)
As in the benchmark case, the duopolists always choose positive levels of
media plurality. Furthermore, media plurality increases with the intensity of
the readerspolitical preferences (t), and with the size of the advertising mar-
ket (high  and low ), but decreases with the informational and exibility
costs of adapting to the readerspolitical preferences ().
To derive equilibrium prices, substitute for ki (i = L;R) from equation
53 in equation 14. It can be shown that the price in the advertising model
is the same as in the benchmark case (equation 19), i.e.: pi = t, i = L;R.
In addition, as in the benchmark case, the demand levels Di are always
positive and the news rms divide the news market in half, i.e.: Di = 12 , with
i = L;R. We also need to ensure that the media plurality segments do not
overlap. It can be shown that ki  Di = 12 (i = L;R) for:
  8t+32
12
. (54)
In the rest of this section, we assume that this condition holds.
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5.2 Advertising: Mixed Duopoly
In this subsection, we derive the advertising model for the mixed duopoly
case.
Stage 2: Prices. In the second stage, news rms choose prices pi, with
i = L;R. For news rm R, the privately owned news rm, prices are obtained
by maximizing the prot expression (equation 12) with respect to pi. It is
straightforward to check that the FOC for prices for news rm R is the
same as in the private duopoly case in the benchmark and advertising cases
(equation 13).
For news rm L, the publicly owned news rm, the FOC is found by
substituting DL from equation 7 in the social welfare function (equation 5).
It results:
@WL
@pL
= (pR pL+(aR aL)( (aL+aR)))
2t
. (55)
Solving @WL
@pL
and dR
dpR
simultaneously for pL and pR, we obtain:
pL = t (kR   kL + 1)  2 (aR   aL) ( (aL + aR)  )
pR = t (kR   kL + 1)  (aR   aL) ( (aL + aR)  ) . (56)
Stage 2: Advertising. In the second stage, the news rms choose adver-
tising levels ai, with i = L;R. The private rm, R, has the same FOC for
advertising as in the private duopoly case, i.e.: equation 46. The same is the
case for the public rm. Substituting for pL and pR from equation 56, we
can simplify dWL
daL
and dR
daR
to:
dWL
daL
= (t(1+kL kR)+(aL aR)( (aL+aR)))( 2aL)
2t
dR
daR
= (t(1 kL+kR)+(aR aL)( (aL+aR)))( 2aR)
2t
. (57)
Solving dWL
daL
and dR
daR
simultaneously for aL and aR (with i; j = L;R and
i 6= j), we obtain the same levels of advertising as in the private duopoly
case8, i.e.: ai = 2 , i = L;R.
8There are four more solutions, but they do not satisfy the SOCs for advertis-
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Stage 1: Media Plurality. In the rst stage, news rms choose media
plurality levels ki, with i = L;R. The FOC for media plurality for the private
news rm is the same as in the private duopoly case (equation 51). We can
then simplify the FOC for media plurality for the privately owned news rm
(equation 51) by substituting for pR from equation 56:
dR
dkR
= t(kR kL+1) (aR aL)((aL+aR) )
3
+ 
2
8
  kR. (58)
In turn, for the publicly owned news rm, after substituting for pL and
pR from equation 51, we have that the FOC for media plurality equals:
dWL
dkL
= t(1 kR kL) 2kL+(aR aL)(aL +aR)
2
. (59)
Solving dWL
dkL
and dR
dkR
simultaneously for kL and kR, we obtain the equi-
librium levels of media plurality:
kL =
(24 32 16t)t
8(2t+3)(2 t)
kR =
(16t+3t2+62)
8(2t+3)(2 t) . (60)
We can derive equilibrium prices by substituting for ki (i = L;R) from
equation 60 into equation 56:
pL = pR =
3(t2+2+82)t
4(2t+3)(2 t) . (61)
From equations 60 and 61, we obtain the demand levels for news rm L
and news rm R:
DL =
(24 16t 32)(t+)
8(2t+3)(2 t)
DR = 1  (24 16t 3
2)(t+)
8(2t+3)(2 t) . (62)
We need to restrict demand levels to being positive, otherwise, there is
no demand for news. We can see that DL and DR are positive for:
ing. These solutions are: aL =

22
q
t
3
(kL kR+1)

2 ; aR =

2 ; aL =

2 ; aR =
(2
p
t
 ( kL+kR+1))
2 .
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  2t
3
+ 3
2
24
. (63)
We assume that this condition holds in the rest of this section. In addi-
tion, we have also to guarantee that the media plurality segments of L and R
do not overlap. Since the publicly owned news rm and the privately owned
news rm provide di¤erent levels of media plurality (see equation 60), we
need two conditions for the two media plurality segments of the news rms
not to overlap: kL  DL and 1   kR  DL. We can show that these two
conditions are satised if   2t
3
+ 3
2
24
. This is the same condition needed
to guarantee that demand levels are positive, which we assume is always
satised.
Next, we would also like to know the relation between kL and kR:
kL   kR = (4t( 2t) 3
2(t+))
4(2t+3)(2 t) . (64)
As shown in appendix B, when the advertising market is large ( < 3
2
4t
),
kL < kR. When the advertising market is small ( > 3
2
4t
), kL < kR for
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
<  < 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 , and kL > kR for  >
3t2+8t2
4t 32 . Then the public
news rm only provides higher media plurality than the news rm when the
advertising market is small, and the costs of adapting news are relatively
high.
5.3 Advertising: Private Duopoly versusMixed Duopoly
In this subsection, we compare the equilibriums of the private duopoly and
the mixed duopoly in terms of prices, media plurality, consumer surplus, and
social welfare.
We can start by showing that the di¤erence between prices in the private
duopoly and the mixed duopoly is:
P = pMD   pPD = (3
2+t(32 4( 2t)))t
4(2t+3)(2 t) . (65)
As shown in appendix B, when the advertising market is large ( < 3
2
4t
),
pMD > pPD. When the advertising market is small ( > 3
2
4t
), pMD > pPD
for 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
<  < 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 , and pMD < pPD for  >
3t2+8t2
4t 32 . The mixed
duopoly then only has a lower price level than in the private duopoly when
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the advertising market is small, and the costs of adapting news are relatively
high.
We have that the di¤erence between media plurality in the private duopoly
and the mixed duopoly equals:
K = KMD  KPD = (t(3
2 4( 2t))+32)(2t 3)
12(2t+3)(2 t) . (66)
As shown in appendix B, when the advertising market is large ( < 3
2
4t
),
KMD < KPD. When the advertising market is small ( > 3
2
4t
), KMD < KPD
for 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
<  < 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 , and KMD > KPD for  >
3t2+8t2
4t 32 . Then the
mixed duopoly only provides higher media plurality than the private duopoly,
when the advertising market is small, and the costs of adapting news are
relatively high.
In this way, when the advertising market is small ( > 3
2
4t
), K and P
behave in the same way as in the benchmark case (see gure 2). The only
di¤erence is that the threshold level for K and P being positive or being
negative is now  > 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 . In turn, when the advertising market is large
( < 3
2
4t
), K and P appear as shown in gure 4.
In turn, looking at prots under the two regimes (mixed duopoly versus
private duopoly), we have:
 = MD   PD =
(t(32 4( 2t))+32)(2723 2t(182(2 17)+t(6(8+2) t(32 4(19 2t)))))
288(2t+3)2(2 t)22 .
(67)
As shown in appendix B, when the advertising market is large ( < 3
2
4t
),
MD > PD. When the advertising market is small ( > 3
2
4t
), MD > PD
for su¢ ciently low values of , and MD < PD for su¢ ciently high values
of . In this way, when the advertising market is large, prots are always
higher in the mixed duopoly. The mixed duopoly then only provides lower
prots than the private duopoly when the advertising market is small, and
the costs of adapting news are relatively high.
In terms of consumer surplus, we have that the di¤erence between con-
sumer surplus under the private duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case
is:
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Figure 4: Prices and Media Plurality: Mixed versus Private Duopoly (Large
Advertising Market)
CS = CSMD   CSPD =
(4t( 2t) 32(t+))(4(3244 8t4 99t3+28t3 54t22) 32(3 2t)(t( 2t)+92))t
576(2t+3)2(2 t)222 .
(68)
As shown in appendix B, when the advertising market is large ( < 3
2
4t
),
CSMD < CSPD. When the advertising market is small ( > 3
2
4t
), CSMD <
CSPD for su¢ ciently low values of , and CSMD > CSPD for su¢ ciently
high values of . In this way, when the advertising market is large, consumer
surplus is always lower in the mixed duopoly. The mixed duopoly then
only provides higher consumer surplus than the private duopoly when the
advertising market is small, and the costs of adapting news are relatively
high.
In turn, in terms of social welfare (consumer surplus plus news rms
prots), we have that the di¤erence between social welfare under the private
duopoly case and the mixed duopoly case is:
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Figure 5: Prots, Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare: Mixed versus Pri-
vate Duopoly (Large Advertising Market)
W = WMD  WPD = (4t( 2t) 3
2(t+))
2
(4t3+183 15t2 8t2)
576(2t+3)2(2 t)222 . (69)
It can be shown that, as in the benchmark case, independently of the size
of the advertising market W is only positive for su¢ ciently high values of 
(see Appendix B). Then, in spite of the size of the advertising market being
important for prots and consumer surplus under the mixed and private
duopoly cases, this does not a¤ect social welfare relatively to the benchmark
case (see gure 3). The only di¤erence is that a large advertising market
makes it more likely that the mixed duopoly case provides higher social
welfare, but does not eliminate the area where the private duopoly has higher
welfare than the mixed duopoly. In addition, the area where the private
duopoly has higher welfare than the mixed duopoly still arises for su¢ ciently
low  (see gure 5).
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6 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ects on media plurality of competition
between a private news rm that maximizes prots and a public news rm
that maximizes social welfare (news rmsprots plus consumer surplus).
We show that media plurality is only higher in the mixed duopoly than
in the private duopoly when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical
preferences are high relative to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences.
When the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences are low
relative to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences, a mixed duopoly
provides lower media plurality than a private duopoly.
Furthermore, industry prots are lower in the mixed duopoly relatively
to the private duopoly when the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical
preferences are high relative to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences.
The contrary is true for consumer surplus and social welfare. Then, when
the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences are low relative
to the intensity of readerspolitical preferences, the presence of a public rm
that has an objective to maximize social welfare does not fulll its purpose.
Contrary to the literature on mixed duopolies, in the news market publicly
owned news rms can only achieve "regulation by participation" in terms of
media plurality and social welfare when the costs of adapting news to readers
political preferences are high relative to the intensity of readers political
preferences. This di¤erence relatively to the literature on mixed duopolies
arises because in media markets news rms compete both on prices and media
plurality. Accordingly, since increasing media plurality also increases price
competition, it is more di¢ cult to achieve "regulation by participation" in
media markets than in markets where rms just compete on prices.
The relation between the costs of adapting news to readerspolitical pref-
erences and the intensity of readerspolitical preference brings the Internet
into the discussion. Some media experts argue that the Internet is changing
the way of doing business in the news market, since amongst other things, it
is boosting media rmscapacity to adapt news to readerspolitical prefer-
ences and of readerscapacity to access more content (Gentzkow, 2007; and
George and Hogendorn, 2012). If this is the case, the Internet is reducing the
costs of adapting news to readerspolitical preferences. However, at same
time readers seem to show a stronger attachment to their own preferred ide-
ology (Sunstein, 2006; and Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2010).
This indicates that the intensity of readers political preferences has also
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increased. It is thus not clear, whether or not news market dominated by
private news rms have become more inclined to provide media plurality.
In other words, we cannot dismiss totally the role of public news rms in
"regulation by participation" in terms of media plurality.
The model in this paper assumes a very simplied version of media mar-
kets. First, like all standard models of media plurality based on the Hotelling
model, the distribution of demand on the line is uniform. If there are peaks
of demand on the line (due for example to mainstream political opinions),
the incentives to provide media plurality can be reduced relatively to the case
where the demand is uniformly distributed on the line (see Mullainathan and
Shleifer, 2005). Second, we have not introduced supply side pressures that
reduce media plurality, such as interest groups and political parties (Baron,
2006; and Besley and Prat, 2006). When interest groups and political parties
control news rms, media plurality can decrease, since news rms might then
end up publishing only the views supported by these groups. However, these
e¤ects can be attenuated if there is competition between interest groups and
political parties for media control. Third, media outlets in our model have a
xed political location. If media rms can choose their political location, the
incentives to adapt news to readerspolitical preferences may be a¤ected,
since price competition may become ercer as media outlets choose locations
closer to the center of the line.
Future work should try to extend our model to tackle some of the lim-
itations that we have just discussed, such as non-uniform demand, interest
groups, and choice of political location. It would also be interesting to an-
alyze empirically when the presence of publicly owned news rms in media
markets contributes to more media plurality and when it does not, i.e., when
public news rms can achieve "regulation by participation" in terms of media
plurality.
A Appendix
Appendix A: Second Order Conditions (SOCs). - Benchmark Case
Private Duopoly:
SOC for prices: d
2i
dp2i
=  1
t
< 0, i = L;R.
SOC for media plurality: d
2i
dk2i
=   < 0, i = L;R.
- Benchmark Case Mixed Duopoly:
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The SOC for prices for the news rm L equals d
2WL
dp2L
=   1
2t
< 0.
The SOC for media plurality for the news rm L is d
2WL
dk2L
=   (t+2)
2
< 0.
- Ine¢ ciencies Case Mixed Duopoly
The SOC for media plurality for the news rm L is d
2WL
dk2L
=   (t+2L)
2
< 0.
- Advertising Case Private Duopoly
The SOC for advertising levels is d
2
i 
da2i
=  (3+ki kj)
3
< 0, i = L;R.
The SOC for media plurality equals d
2i
dk2i
=   < 0, i = L;R.
- Advertising Case Mixed Duopoly
The SOC for prices for the news rm L is d
2WL
dp2L
=   1
2t
< 0.
SOCs for advertising are:d
2WL
da2L
=  2t(1+kL kR)+(6aL( aL) 2aR( aR) 
2)
2t
<
0 and d
2R
da2R
=  2t(1+kR kL)+(6aR( aR) 2aL( aL) 
2)
2t
< 0.
The SOC for media plurality for the news rm L is d
2WL
dk2L
=   (t+2)
2
< 0.
Appendix B: Other Proofs. Equation 30: Since   2t
3
, the sign of this
expression depends only on the numerator. The numerator of equation 30
has two solutions, 2t
3
and 2t, and is a convex function. The proof then follows.
Equation 31: The sign of this expression depends only on the numerator.
The second term in the numerator, (   2t), is positive for  > 2t, and
negative for  < 2t. We can also show that the rst term is always negative
in the interval,   2t
3
, where our model is valid. To see this note that
(2t (19t+ 12)  1532) has two solutions, t(4 
p
662)
51
and
t(4+
p
662)
51
, and is a
concave function in . Since 2t
3
>
t(4+
p
662)
51
>
t(4 
p
662)
51
, the proof follows.
Equation 32: The sign of the expression only depends on the numera-
tor. The second term in the numerator, (   2t), is positive for  > 2t,
and negative for  < 2t. We can also show that the rst term is always
positive in the interval,   2t
3
, where our model is valid. To see this
note rst that 4t3 (7   2t) is always positive for   2t
3
. The same oc-
curs with the term ( (36   11t)  6t2). In fact, ( (36   11t)  6t2) has
two solutions,
t(11 
p
985)
72
and
t(11+
p
985)
72
, and is a convex function in . Since
2t
3
>
t(11+
p
985)
72
>
t(11 
p
985)
72
, the proof follows.
Equation 33: W can only be negative for 2
3
t <  <
(5+
p
89)t
12
. To
see this note that all terms in equation 33 are unambiguously positive with
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the exception of 182   t (8t+ 15). This term has two solutions, (5 
p
89)t
12
and(
5+
p
89)t
12
. Furthermore, 182   t (8t+ 15) is a convex function. Note
also that our model is valid in the interval   2t
3
, and that (
5 p89)t
12
< 2t
3
<
(5+
p
89)t
12
. Then the proof follows.
Equation 40: The denominator of the expression is always positive since
R  2t3 . In turn, the numerator is negative, i.e.: kL < kR, if R < 23 (t+ L).
The proof follows.
Equation 41: The denominator of the expression is always positive since
R  2t3 . In turn, the numerator is positive, i.e.: pMD < pPD, if R >
2
3
(t+ L). The proof then follows.
Equation 42: The denominator of the expression is always positive since
R  2t3 . In turn, the numerator is positive, i.e.: KMD > KPD, if R >
2
3
(t+ L). The proof then follows.
Equation 43: The denominator is always positive. In turn, the numerator
is decreasing function in R. To see this note that the term in numerator at
R =
2t
3
equals 40t22L (i.e.:  > 0 at R =
2t
3
), and at R =
2
3
(t+ L)
equals 82L (t+ L) (2t  L) (i.e.:  < 0 at R = 23 (t+ L)). Further-
more, 40t22L > 8
2
L (t+ L) (2t  L). This means that  is negative for
higher values of R, and positive for smaller values of R.
Equation 44: The denominator is always positive. The second term in
the numerator is positive for R >
2
3
(t+ L). In turn, the second term
in the numerator is increasing in R. To see this note that the rst term
in numerator at R =
2t
3
equals 32Lt
3, and at R =
2
3
(t+ L) equals
32L (t+ L) (4tL + 2t
2 + 32L). Furthermore, 32Lt
3 < 32L (t+ L) (4tL + 2t
2 + 32L).
This means that CS is negative for lower values of R, and positive for
higher values of R.
Equation 45: The denominator is always positive. In turn, the term
in the numerator is increasing in R. To see this note that the rst term
in numerator at R =
2t
3
equals  32
3
2Lt
3, and at R =
2
3
(t+ L) equals
32
3
2L (L   2t) (t+ L)2. Furthermore,  323 2Lt3 < 323 2L (L   2t) (t+ L)2.
This means that W is negative for lower values of R, and positive for
higher values of R.
Equation 64: The denominator is positive for  > t
2
, which is always
the case since 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> t
2
. The numerator has a solution  = (
3t2+8t2)
(4t 32) .
Furthermore, since 0 < 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  >
32
4t
(i.e.: small advertising
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market), and 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 < 0 <
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
for  < 3
2
4t
(i.e.: large advertising
market), the result follows.
Equation 65: The denominator is positive for  > t
2
, which is always
the case since 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> t
2
. The term in the numerator has the solution
 =
(3t2+8t2)
(4t 32) . Furthermore, since
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  <
32
4t
(i.e.:
large advertising market), while 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  >
32
4t
(i.e.: small
advertising market), the result follows.
Equation 66: The denominator is positive for  > t
2
, which is always the
case since 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> t
2
. The second term in the numerator is negative for
 > 2t
3
, which again is always the case since 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 2t
3
. The rst term in
the numerator has the solution  = (
3t2+8t2)
(4t 32) . Furthermore, since
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
>
3t2+8t2
4t 32 for  <
32
4t
(i.e.: large advertising market), while 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32
for  > 3
2
4t
(i.e.: small advertising market), the result follows.
Equation 67: The denominator is always positive. The rst term in the
numerator is positive for R >
3t2+8t2
4t 32 . In turn, the second term in the
numerator is decreasing in R. To see this note that the rst term in nu-
merator at R =
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
equals (
94+144t2+640t22)(32t+32)(4t+32)
15363
, and at
R =
3t2+8t2
4t 32 equals
3(4t+32)(32t+32)(8t+32)(88t+152)t3
(4t 32)3 . Furthermore,
(94+144t2+640t22)(32t+32)(4t+32)
15363
>
3(4t+32)(32t+32)(8t+32)(88t+152)t3
(4t 32)3 .
Since, 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  <
32
4t
(i.e.: large advertising market), while
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  >
32
4t
(i.e.: small advertising market), then we
have the following. For 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 ,  is always positive. For
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 ,  is positive for lower values of , and negative for
higher values of .
Equation 68: The denominator is always positive. The rst term in
the numerator is positive for R >
3t2+8t2
4t 32 . In turn, the second term in
the numerator is increasing in R. To see this note that the rst term
in numerator at R =
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
equals (
32t+32)
2
(32t+92)(4t+32)
15363
, and at
R =
3t2+8t2
4t 32 equals
6(8t+32)
2
(4t+32)(32t+32)(88t+152)t3
(4t 32)4 . Furthermore,
6(8t+32)
2
(4t+32)(32t+32)(88t+152)t3
(4t 32)4 >
(32t+32)
2
(32t+92)(4t+32)
15363
. Since,
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2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  <
32
4t
(i.e.: large advertising market), while
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 for  >
32
4t
(i.e.: small advertising market), we have
the following. For 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 , CS is always negative. For
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 , CS is negative for lower values of , and positive
for higher values of .
Equation 69: The denominator in this equation is always positive. The
same is also the case with the rst term in the numerator. In turn, the
second term in the numerator is made up of two terms 4t3 (which is always
positive) and  (182   15t   8t2). The term (182   15t   8t2) has two
solutions,
t(5 
p
89)
12
and
t(5+
p
89)
12
, and is a convex function. Since, 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
>
t(5+
p
89)
12
>
t(5 
p
89)
12
, then the proof follows, whether 2t
3
+ 3
2
24
> 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 or
2t
3
+ 3
2
24
< 3t
2+8t2
4t 32 .
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